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4 On the adaptiveness of
territorial behaviour:
dependence on strategy space
and initial conditions
Martin Hinsch · Ana Duarte · Jan Komdeur
In the last two decades the process by which interactions between in-
dividuals lead to the emergence of territories has become a focus of
theoretical research. The only general evolutionary model of this pro-
cess so far has been presented by Morrell & Kokko (2005). Compar-
ing the invasion prospects of four discrete behavioural strategies they
concluded that high fighting costs lead to the evolution of territorial-
ity whereas low costs result in overlapping home ranges. We show that
a simplified non-spatial version of their model reproduces their res-
ults. In a spatially explicit dynamic evolutionary version this is how-
ever no longer true in general when a continuous range of strategies
is assumed. Instead, depending on the initial conditions different
strategies with a variety of space use patterns evolve.
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4.1 Introduction
In most of the earlier theoretical work on the evolution of territoriality, the
proximate process that leads to the formation of territories received very
little attention. Most authors focused on territorial behaviour within a pop-
ulation with fully formed territories (e.g. Schoener, 1987; Gintis, 2007). If
territory formation was taken into account then it was usually assumed that
individuals establish territories by deciding unilaterally which amount of
space to defend against competitors (e.g. Parker & Knowlton, 1980; for an
exception see Maynard Smith, 1982).
Only in the last two decades a new approach to the theoretical study of
territoriality has emerged that explicitly considers how interactions between
individuals can lead to the formation of territories (Giuggioli & Kenkre, 2014;
Potts & Lewis, 2014). Stamps & Krishnan (1997) were the first to suggest that
territories should be seen as an emergent property of local antagonistic in-
teractions between individuals. They proposed to model territorial beha-
viour as a learning-based process in which individuals adjust the perceived
“attractiveness” of an area dependent on their experiences in that area, in-
creasing it after exploration and decreasing it after aggressive interactions.
Depending on the specific behavioural rules, a model of this process was
indeed able to produce exclusively owned territories or complete sharing of
space (Stamps & Krishnan, 1999, 2001).
Stamps & Krishnan (1999) and Stamps & Krishnan (2001) however only
studied the proximate consequences of different behavioural strategies and
refrained from investigating their evolutionary origins and stability. Expand-
ing on earlier work (Morrell & Kokko, 2003; Adler & Gordon, 2003), Mor-
rell & Kokko (2005) (henceforth abbreviated as M&K) set out to fill this gap
by investigating the adaptiveness of territorial behaviour with a simulation
model based on the general approach described by Stamps & Krishnan (1999).
They determined the relative fitness values and the space use that resulted
from interactions of a set of behavioural strategies. From the results of this
analysis M&K concluded that if the costs of interactions between individu-
als are low, overlapping home ranges evolve whereas high costs lead to the
evolution of territories.
While these results are interesting and valuable it is unclear how gen-
eral they are. M&K investigated a very small part of the set of potential
strategies by selecting only four specific strategies out of a continuous four-
dimensional strategy space. Furthermore their invasion analysis was only
based on selection gradients for pairwise interactions at three specific com-
binations of frequencies in the population (for details see section 2).
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In this article we aim to test how well M&K’s results hold up if we general-
ize their model to a) a continuous strategy space and b) explicit individual-
based evolution. We first give a brief overview of M&K’s model. Then we
analyse a slightly simplified, spatially implicit analytical model that allows
us to find globally evolutionarily stable points. In the second step we present
a strict superset of M&K’s model that simulates the actual evolution of the
individuals’ behaviour over time without imposing any restrictions on which
strategies the population consists of or with which frequencies they occur.
4.2 The original model
We will first give a brief description of the original model as presented by
Morrell & Kokko (2005). For a more detailed description please refer to the
original article.
Individuals live in a habitat consisting of discrete cells in a 2-dimensional
grid. For each individual an occupancy value between 0 and 1 indicates
whether and to which degree it uses any given cell. In each time step in-
dividuals explore cells adjacent to the ones already occupied by them by in-
creasing the occupancy values in these cells. Fights occur wherever two in-
dividuals end up occupying the same grid cell. Fights end either with a draw
(with probability pdraw) or with one of the individuals winning and the other
losing (pwin = plose = (1− pdraw)/2). Individuals then change the degree of
occupancy of the respective cell by adding or subtracting a value δ depend-
ent on the outcome of the fight. Accordingly, the strategy of an individual
consists of a set of δ-values δwin, δlose, δdraw which correspond to the
three possible outcomes win, lose and draw. It is important to note that the
consequences of a specific outcome of a fight are described entirely by these
δ-values. In this sense win and lose are just convenient labels which are
completely interchangeable. A fourth value, δempty, describes the change
in occupancy when a cell is found empty.
The fitness of an individual was assumed to be a product of benefits and
interaction costs. Benefits equal the sum (over all cells) of the relative oc-
cupancy after 100 interaction steps. Interaction costs are calculated as the
negative exponential of the number of interactions (in all time steps) scaled
by a constant factor c (further referred to as “costs”).
M&K investigated four specific strategies, i.e. four combinations ofδ-values:
cautious - always retreat after fights (δwin = −0.1, δlose = −0.1, δdraw =
−0.1, δempty = 0.1), common sense - only retreat after losing and drawing
(0.1,-0.1,-0.1,0.1), daring - only retreat after losing (0.1,-0.1,0.1,0.1), para-
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doxical - only stay after losing, and drawing, the opposite of common sense
(-0.1,0.1,0.1,-0.1). For each combination x and y of two (out of these four)
strategies M&K measured the fitness of a single individual of one type in a
population of individuals of the other type and the respective mean fitness
of x- and y-individuals when both constitute half of the population. These
measures were used to determine which of the four strategies can invade or
be invaded by which other strategy.
4.3 Mathematical Model
In the first step we analyse a mathematical description of M&K’s model. In
order to make the model mathematically tractable we disregard spatial rela-
tionships between habitat sites and simplify the strategy space. This allows
us to derive global stability criteria while still being able to test the adaptive-
ness of avoidance as postulated by M&K.
The model consists of two parts. In the interaction part the distribution
of the ownership of sites in the dynamic equilibrium is determined. In the
evolution part an expression for the fitness of two competing individuals is
derived. The invasion fitness of a rare mutant allows us to determine evolu-
tionarily stable points (Geritz et al., 1998).
Interaction
We model the interaction of two individuals (out of a sufficiently large pop-
ulation) at a time. They compete for a large number of resource sites by
abandoning sites and occupying new ones following a specific strategy d .
Sites can be in one of four states: unoccupied (u), owned by individual a
(a), owned by individual b (b) or shared between a and b (s). The propor-
tion of sites in each of these states changes based on two processes: First,
during each time step individuals explore new sites by occupying a random
fraction ² of all sites. Second, they abandon shared sites as determined by
their strategy d , i.e. a probability of da and db , respectively. Given a large
number of sites we can describe how the fraction of sites currently in each








1−² 0 ²(1−²) db(1−da)
0 1−² ²(1−²) da(1−db)
0 0 (1−²)2 dadb







 (t ) (4.1)
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From this the long term equilibrium distribution of ownership for given trait



















We assume fitness of a given trait value d when interacting with a different
trait d ′ is a function of the amount of exclusive and shared space that results
from the interaction of two individuals showing the respective traits:
wd ,d ′ =w(a∗(d ,d ′), s∗(d ,d ′)) (4.3)
We now look at the fitness of a mutant dinv in a uniform resident popula-
tion dres. If the mutant is rare we can assume that individuals of the resident
type only interact with each other whereas the mutant only interacts with
residents. We can therefore derive invasion fitness of the mutant winv ac-
cordingly:
winv =w(a∗(dinv,dres), s∗(dinv,dres)) (4.4)
Evolution of avoidance
The tendency to retreat after encounters d will increase in the course of
evolution if the fitness of a mutant which is very similar to the resident type
















Using equation 4.2 to calculate the derivatives of a∗ and s∗ with respect to









4 Dependence on strategy space and initial conditions
Following M&K we assume that fitness increases with the amount of exclus-
ive space thus ∂w∂a > 0. Further we know that d and ² lie between 0 and 1 so
the whole first term ∂w∂a · 2d²(2−d−²) of the left hand side of the inequality has to
be positive. It follows that the inequality can only hold if ∂w∂s < 0. Strength of
avoidance d can thus only increase in evolutionary time if a gain of shared
space reduces fitness to a sufficient degree. It is also immediately visible
that to always share (d = 0) can only be evolutionarily stable if ∂w∂s > 0, i.e. if
a decrease in amount of shared space leads to a decrease in fitness.
Dependence on ghting costs





















Now we assume that the influence of shared space on fitness (∂w∂s ) is mod-
ulated by a parameter c, “fighting costs”. Everything else being equal higher
fighting costs should lead to a decrease in fitness and to a more negative








The change of the evolutionarily stable degree of avoidance d∗ with fight-
























Since we know that fitness increases with amount of exclusive space a (∂w∂a >
0), according to our definition of costs in inequality 4.7 the right hand side
of inequality 4.8 has to be negative. From before we also can say that for a
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positive evolutionarily stable value of d to exist fitness has to decrease with
shared space. If we further assume that the fitness gain through exclusive
space at least does not increase with higher costs the left hand side becomes
positive or zero and the condition holds.
To recapitulate, when fitness decreases with increasing amount of shared
space avoidance becomes adaptive and the evolutionarily stable value of
avoidance increases with increasing fighting costs.
Example
We will illustrate these results with a concrete fitness function. Following
M&K we define fitness as a product of benefits and costs:
w :=B ·C = (a+ 1
2
s)e−cs (4.9)
Although possible, analysis of the full model with this fitness function
leads to very complicated expressions for the evolutionarily stable trait value.
For this example we therefore use a simplified version of the model which
shows the same qualitative behaviour. We assume that a and b never leave
or enter a site at the same time. Then sites, once occupied, can not become
unoccupied any more so that u = 0 at equilibrium. This allows us to only
consider the states a, b, and s. Further the terms ²2 and dadb disappear,





 (t ) ·
 1−² 0 db0 1−² da
² ² 1−da −db
 (4.10)
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We see that under low costs individuals will not abandon sites after an en-
counter (d∗ close to 0) leading to shared space (s close to 1) whereas high
costs result in complete avoidance and therefore mainly exclusive space
(a,b close to 12 ).
4.4 Spatially explicit Simulations
In order to allow for evolution to take place we slightly extended M&K’s
model:
Each individual has a genome consisting of a single set of four δ-values
which is transmitted to its offspring during clonal reproduction. The muta-
tion probability per gene and generation is 0.01. Genes are mutated by
adding a random value uniformly distributed between −0.025 and 0.025.
The population always consists of 300 individuals. At the beginning of a
generation the individuals are randomly distributed over 20 patches, with
a fixed number of 15 individuals per patch. Subsequently interactions take
place in each patch during 100 within-generation time steps in exactly the
same way as in the original model. At the end of a generation all 300 in-
dividuals are lumped together into one population again. An individual’s
probability to reproduce is determined by its relative fitness with respect to
the whole population. After reproduction all parent individuals die.
In situations where conventions, i.e. arbitrary population-wide agreements
are used to settle conflicts the composition of the starting population can
determine which convention will emerge in the population (Maynard Smith,
1982). We therefore tested six different initial conditions, i.e. ways of de-
termining the genetic composition of the population at the beginning of the
simulation runs. In the first scenario we started with a “neutral” population
with all δ values set to zero. In the second scenario we initialized all indi-
viduals in the population at random by drawing for each δ a value between
−0.2 and 0.2 (a range which includes all strategies used by M&K). Finally
for each of the four strategies used by M&K we started a set of simulations
where initially all individuals followed that strategy.
Of M&K’s three parameters we kept draw probability and patch size fixed




Figure 4.1: Mean and standard deviation of evolvedδ-values for a) low and b) high costs. Since
δwin and δlose are interchangeable (see model description in the text) their ab-
solute difference is used. For each of the scenarios starting with a single strategy
(neutral=0, cautious=CA, common sense=CS, daring=DA and paradoxical=PA)
the starting point (open circles) and the outcome after 15000 generations (filled
circles) is shown.
ario we ran 20 replicates over 15000 generations both at low (c = 0.0001) and
high fighting costs (c = 0.005).
4.5 Results
Strategies
The outcome of evolution of the δ-values shows some general patterns. In
the majority of the cases the evolved values are negative. In most runsδempty
reaches a value around -0.065 (not shown). However there is no single strategy
(i.e. combination of δ-values) or group of strategies which evolves under
all starting conditions. Only when starting with neutral and cautious initial
conditions under low fighting costs the same strategies evolve (see Fig. 4.1).
For all other starting points the δ-values evolved after 15000 generations dif-
fer markedly from each other.
Even given the same initial population, differences between replicates are
large, especially under high fighting costs (Fig. 4.1). The only exceptions are
again neutral and cautious initial conditions under low fighting costs, where
in all replicates very similar combinations of δ-values evolve.
In all cases the δ-values after 15000 generations differ considerably from
the starting points. This indicates that all initial conditions tested - includ-
ing the four strategies used by M&K - are evolutionarily unstable.
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Space use
As can be seen in Fig. 4.2 a variety of patterns of space use evolves. The
shape of the areas occupied by individuals varies strongly. In some cases
they inhabit compact contiguous areas (Fig. 4.2 b,e), in others the cells owned
by an individual are spread out over the whole habitat (Fig. 4.2 d,f). The de-
gree of sharing varies as well, ranging from nearly all space being shared
(Fig. 4.2 a, b) to exclusively used areas (Fig. 4.2 e).
With few exceptions fighting costs as well as initialization seem to have
little systematic effect on which patterns occur. Only when starting with
a neutral or a cautious population a clear picture emerges, with low costs
leading to compact overlapping home ranges (Fig. 4.2 b) and high costs to
exclusive and contiguous territories (Fig. 4.2 e).
These two patterns also occur under random initial conditions. In addi-
tion however we also see patterns c, d and f (Fig. 4.2). In these cases the cells
occupied by an individual no longer form a compact contiguous area. Pat-
terns d and f further show a high turnover rate with ownership of nearly all
cells changing between time steps (not shown).
The patterns which evolve when starting with one of the four strategies
used by M&K differ considerably. Starting with cautious leads to very sim-
ilar results as the neutral scenario showing nearly identical spatial patterns.
Letting all individuals start with common sense leads for low costs to the
evolution of a pattern of spread out dots (Fig. 4.2 d). In all other cases we
encounter a mixture of all patterns seen so far including some intermediate
ones. In some cases we even see “extinction” where no individuals occupy
any space at all (not shown).
All types of patterns occur for low as well as for high fighting costs with -
per pattern - only slight differences in the amount of exclusive space between
scenarios. Nevertheless for most initial conditions the amount of exclusive
space clearly increases with fighting costs (Fig. 4.3).
This effect is strongest when starting out with a neutral or a cautious pop-
ulation (Fig. 4.3 a,c). It is still clearly visible for the cautious initial conditions
(Fig. 4.3 a,c) and weak when starting with daring, common sense (Fig. 4.3 d)
or paradoxical (Fig. 4.3 f).
4.6 Discussion
Our results show that the choice of strategy space as well as taking into ac-
count spatial effects strongly influence which behavioural strategies evolve






Figure 4.2: Examples for typical evolved patterns of space use. Each of the small grids
indicates the space use (immediately before reproduction) of one of the 15
individuals inhabiting a patch. Cells in which the focal individual is the
only occupant (exclusive space) are indicated by circles; cells which it does
not occupy (occupancy zero) are left empty, filled cells are those it shares
with other individuals (shared space). In cases a-d most occupied space
is shared by several occupants whereas in e and f each cell is owned by a
single individual. The space used by an individual can form a compact
contiguous area (b, e) or consist of disconnected single cells (d, f). Scenarios
and initial conditions are: a - CS, high costs; b - neutral, low costs; c - PA,
low costs; d - random, low costs; e - neutral, high costs; f - DA, high costs
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Figure 4.3: Exclusive space versus total occupied space per individual after 15000 generations
for low (empty circles) and high costs (filled circles). Each circle represents one rep-
licate. Points on the diagonal represent cases where there is no shared space (ex-




simplified non-spatial analytical model confirms M&K’s results - high inter-
action costs lead to avoidance and thus exclusive space - the results of the
simulation present a considerably more complicated picture.
We see that with the introduction of spatial effects and in a slightly more
complicated strategy space the composition of the starting population de-
termines to a large degree the outcome of evolution. The evolved δ-values
differ strongly between runs with different initializations and even in scen-
arios with a homogeneous initial population the variability between replic-
ates is very high (see Fig. 4.1). This indicates that within the continuous
strategy space not just a single evolutionarily stable strategy exists. Fur-
thermore not only the genetic composition of the initial population but also
stochastic effects seem to determine to a big extent which combination of
δ-values evolves. (see Fig. 4.2).
It is known from game theory that games with multiple parameters tend to
have multiple equilibria (e.g. Haigh, 1975; Broom & Cannings, 1999). There-
fore the possibility exists that an increase in the number of available strategies
will lead to the appearance of additional stable equilibria which might not
be accessible from every initial condition. This has for example been shown
for the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (Lindgren, 1992; Brembs, 1996) and for
models of social dominance (Van Doorn et al., 2003a,b). Therefore it is not
surprising that the four strategies used by M&K turn out to be evolutionarily
unstable within the continuous strategy space and that the analysis based
on them resulted in a different and much simpler picture of the evolution-
ary dynamics.
For the six different initial conditions we investigated, only the results of
the neutral and the cautious scenarios lend themselves to easy interpreta-
tion. The same stable combination of δ-values is reached in all replicates for
low fighting costs, while the variation in evolved strategies is limited for high
costs (see Fig. 4.1). The corresponding spatial patterns are clearly identifi-
able as either overlapping home ranges (low costs) or territories (high costs)
which is in line with our mathematical analysis and M&K’s main conclu-
sions.
For all other starting conditions, however, we see a very different picture.
Corresponding to the variability in δ-values the resulting patterns of space
use are very diverse. Several patterns are difficult to classify as either territ-
orial or non-territorial (see Fig. 4.2). Furthermore for most starting condi-
tions no clear effect of fighting costs on the pattern of space use is detectable
(not shown).
Despite the variety of spatial patterns however we see that in most scen-
arios the amount of exclusive space per individual is significantly higher un-
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der high than under low fighting costs (Fig. 4.3). This indicates that the trend
of higher costs leading to less sharing of space which was found by M&K and
in our analytical model is a general phenomenon, confirming earlier results
(e.g. Adler & Gordon, 2003; Morrell & Kokko, 2003). Future research will have
to investigate under which conditions a high amount of exclusive space is
indicative of territorial behaviour.
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